Construction of the panel from the ASIF data. In the dataset, every firm is given a unique firm code. A small number of firms may have changed their firm codes within the sample period but remained in the sample. To address this issue, we follow Brandt et al. (2012) and Yang (2015) to obtain unique firm codes based on the firm's name, zip code, telephone number, and founding year. We clean the data as follows. First, if the year t observation of a firm cannot be matched to any firm's observation in year t+1 based on the firm code, we try to find a firm with the same name in year t+1, and match them by giving the year t+1 observation the same firm code as the year t observation. Second, for those firms that cannot be matched by the code or name, we rely on the combinations of the zip code, telephone number and the founding year to match them. We delete firms with missing key information, i.e. assets, fixed assets, sales and employment. Note: Entrants are those that first appear in the sample in the specific year. Exiting means dropping out of the sample in the next year. The ASIF dataset includes all SOEs, and all non-state firms with sales exceeding five million yuan. Thus, a firm's entry year may be different from its establishment year. Similarly, a firm's exiting year may differ from its death year.
Note: Entrants are those that first appear in the sample in the specific year. Exiting means dropping out of the sample in the next year. The ASIF dataset includes all SOEs, and all non-state firms with sales exceeding five million yuan. Thus, a firm's entry year may be different from its establishment year. Similarly, a firm's exiting year may differ from its death year. 
Variables
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Step 4 Step 5 Note:
Step 1 restricts our sample to SOEs with non-missing oversight government status.
Step 2 drops SOEs that are initially oversighted by county governments.
Step 3 drops SOEs without at least three continuous years of data.
Step 4 drops observations with abnormal oversight government statuses.
Step 5 further drops i) all observations in the first year and ii) observations after decentralization for the ever-decentralized sample, to obtain our regression sample.
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Brandt Note: This table lists summary statistics of SOEs that were decentralized and those that were not decentralized during [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The values in column (1) refer to the pre-decentralization means for all the years prior to decentralization for the eventually-decentralized SOEs. Column (3) shows the mean difference, and column (4) shows the associated standard deviation. An SOE is defined as decentralized if its affiliation level is changed to a lower-level government. The numbers of firms and observations are the same as those in the baseline regressions. 
Note: This document shows that in Shandong Province, decentralization is listed as one of the six reform methods (franchising, privatization, transfer, decentralization, merger and acquisition, and bankruptcy). The underlined sentences state that, for SOEs suitable to be under oversight of municipal and county governments, especially those small and medium SOEs that are located far away with which the provincial government has difficulty directly managing, they should be restructured under the oversight of the municipality, and all issues related to taxes and subsidies, labor, and statistics should be adjusted accordingly. Table 3 Columns (6)- (7), but differentiates the "restructuring" outcome into "explicit privatization" and "exit from the sample." For each firm in year t, there are four possible outcomes, with "neither restructured nor decentralized" being the base. The three columns report the marginal effect of each regressor on the probability of being Decentralized, being Explicitly privatized, and Exiting the sample, respectively. The control variables are the same as in Table 3 . Standard errors clustered at the oversight-government level are reported in the parentheses. Table 3 . Standard errors clustered at the oversight-government level are reported in the parentheses. 
Appendix F. Alternative definitions of SOEs

Appendix G. Slight alterations of samples
In Panel A of Table G -1, we present the results when we keep SOEs with abnormal decentralization cases. Abnormal decentralizations refer to the cases when SOEs were decentralized in year t, but then immediately re-centralized in year t+1. In total, 312 SOEs experienced such abnormal decentralizations. In our baseline regressions, we delete those SOEs with abnormal decentralizations because these cases likely reflect coding errors. Here, we include these cases and repeat our baseline regressions to check the robustness of our key results.
In Panel B, we allow multiple cases of decentralization for a single SOE. In our sample, 26 SOEs experienced two episodes of decentralization. In our baseline, we only keep the first episode of decentralization. In Panel B, we allow more than one episode of decentralizations for an SOE.
In Panel C, we present results when we add back firms with only 2 years of consecutive observations and control for once-lagged covariates. Table 3 . Upper government dummy is the upper-level government dummy. Standard errors clustered at the oversight-government level are reported in the parentheses.
Appendix H. Determinants of Centralization
Appendix I. China's third-front industries
China experienced massive relocation of firms from the coastal to her inland provinces during the 1960s and 1970s, relocation known as the Third Front Construction (TFC) program. The move was a response to perceived military threats from the USSR and the USA. In August 1964, North Vietnam and the U.S. navy had a series of confrontations in the waters of Tonkin Gulf. The U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave President Lyndon B. Johnson the authorization to deploy forces and commence warfare against North Vietnam. Feeling that the war might escalate and China might eventually confront the U.S. military forces, Mao Zedong decided to move China's key heavy-industry and other strategically important firms (then largely fully state-owned) to China's inland provinces so that they would survive likely air assaults. The relocation was temporarily stopped in 1966 due to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, and was resumed after March 1969, when China was engaged in a military clash with the USSR over Zhenbao (also known as Damansky) Island. With Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972, China managed to improve her relationship with the west. This led to a relief of security pressure; the TFC came to a halt afterwards. During these two periods, 1964-1966 and 1969-1971 , China relocated more than 1100 factories and about 4 million workers to mountainous areas in West China (roughly south of Yanmengguan，north of Shaoguan city in Guangdong province, west of Beijing-Guangzhou railroad, east of Wuqiaoling in Gansu province, see Figure I -1 for a map). The result was a sudden increase in the number of SOEs in these areas during the two periods (see Figure I -2). We thus construct a dummy variable TFC, which is one if a firm was established during the TFC period (i.e. 1964-1966, or 1969-1971) and in the TFC Region (Chen, 2003; Li and Long, 2013) . Note: The data is from ASIF in 1998. We use the establishment year of an SOE to define new firms in the TFC area. The proportion and characteristics of compliers. The instrumental variable estimates represent the local average treatment effect (LATE) among a subpopulation of firms whose distance to the oversight government is affected by TFC. This type of firms are called "complier," as opposed to always takers and never-takes whose treatment status is not affected by TFC. To characterize the traits of compliers, we need to use the framework of dummy treatment variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). We thus replace the continuous distance measure with the dummy variable of the SOE being located in different cities as the oversight government ("Di").
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While it is impossible to identify the complier status of an individual firm in the sample, it is possible to calculate the proportion of compliers among the treated SOEs (i.e. SOEs that are far from the oversight government) (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Given monotonicity, the proportion of compliers among all treated SOEs is given by:
In our paper, the instrument status = 1 indicates that the SOE is affiliated with TFC. P and E are probability and expectation operators. We cannot identify individual compliers since we do not observe both D1i and D0i. However, we can characterize the distributions of compliers' pre-treatment characteristics (Angrist and Pischke 2009). In particular, for a particular binary covariate (say Xk), the relative likelihood that a complier is 1, that is,
, is given by the ratio of the first stage for the sub-sample of Xik being 1 to the first stage for the overall sample. We focus on the key once-lagged covariates (to be transformed into dummy variables to be consistent with the feasible methodology in Angrist and Pischke, 2009) in our baseline model. The results are reported in Table J -2 below. Note. The full sample is the same as that used in the baseline linear probability model. Note that we use the dummy of the oversight government and the SOE being in different cities as our distance measure. For each column, the sample consists of "Above median for the specific variable" (with each column corresponding to a different variable).
References:
Angrist 
Appendix K. Estimating TFP
Here we describe how we estimate the firm-level TFP in three ways. We use a standard log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate the firm-level TFP. Specifically, the TFP of firm i in year t is the estimated residual from the regression:
where is the logarithm of value-added, and and are the logarithms of capital and labor, respectively. To allow for different factor intensities across industries, we estimate equation (A1) separately for each two-digit industries. TFP can be interpreted as the relative productivity of a firm within its industry.
Real value added is constructed by subtracting the deflated input from the real output. We use the two-digit ex-factory price index from China Urban Living and Price Statistics to deflate the output. The input deflator is calculated based on the available output deflators at the two-digit industry level and information from the National Input-Output (IO) tables in 1997, 2002, and 2007 . From the IO table, we know how much inputs are needed to produce one unit of output. Then the average input price index is the weighted average of the price indices of those inputs. Thus, to obtain the input deflator for each industry, we calculate a weighted average of the input deflators, using as weights the coefficients in the IO table.
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In the ASIF dataset, firms report the total annual employment, but they do not report the real capital stock. Instead, the firms report the value of their fixed capital stock at the original purchase prices. As these book values are the sum of the nominal values for different years, they are not equal to the real capital stock and are not comparable across time and across firms.
Since we do not have all past investments of a firm to construct the real capital stock, we roughly follow Brandt et al. (2012) and make several assumptions to convert the value of their capital stock at the original purchase prices into the real values using the following procedures.
First, we estimate the nominal value of the capital stock for each year between a firm's birth year and the first year in which the firm appears in our data set. For simplicity, we assume that it is 1998, the first year of our panel. We assume that the growth rate of the nominal capital stock of each firm equals to the growth rate of the nominal capital stock in the corresponding two-digit industry, which is reported in the China Statistical Yearbooks. 3 We then calculate the nominal capital stock in 1998 with the following equation:
Where 1998 is the nominal captial stock in 1998 reported in the ASIF data, s indicate the firm's first year of operation, is the nominal captial stock of the firm in its birth year, and is the growth rate of the nominal capital stock in the two-digit industry in year t, which is reported by the China Statistics Yearbook. From equation (A2), we can calculate the nominal stock in each year between the firm's birth year and 1998. Second, the annual nominal investment is the change in the nominal capital stock between two consecutive years, that is, = − −1 . Third, we derive the real capital stock for each year between the firm's birth year and 1998. We deflate the annual nominal investment in each year into the real value using the investment deflator, which is in China Statistics Yearbook from 1990. For years 1986-1989, we use the investment deflator constructed by Perkins and Rawski (2008) .
Fourth, we obtain the real capital stock in 1998 from the perpetual inventory method. Specifically, = (1 − ) −1 + Where is the real capital stock in year t, and is the depreciation rate, which is estimated by accumulated depreciation reported in 1998 1998−s / 1998 . Finally, we obtain the annual real investment and the real capital stock after 1998. For years after 1998, we use the observed change in the firm's nominal capital stock at the original purchase prices as our estimate of the nominal annual investment, that is, the nominal annual investment is still obtained from − −1 . The real fixed investment is obtained by deflating with the investment deflator in China Statistics Yearbook. The Real capital stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory method, that is,
is annual depreciation that is reported in ASIF, again deflated by the investment deflators in China Statistics Yearbook.
We estimate equation (A1) by ordinary least squares (OLS). We call this TFP-OLS.
While this approach is commonly used in the literature, the existing research has argued that the OLS estimates suffer from two endogeneity issues: simultaneity of input choices and selection biases. These two issues will generate biased estimates of and , and therefore biased estimates of the TFP. A variety of techniques have been suggested to address these issues. We use the widely-used method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) . We call this TFP-OP.
As a robustness check, we use a straightforward index number approach, which does not require estimating any parameters. To implement, the industryspecific wage share in the output is used to measure . One minus this share is used to measure . Here the assumption is that a cost-minimizing firm will make sure that the relative factor price ratio equals the local elasticity of substitution between the inputs of the production technology. Since we do not have good comparable data to compute factor shares based on our survey data, we rely on the estimates of the factor shares at the two-digit industry level from Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2003) , as in Bloom et al. (2012) . We call this TFP-IN.
Overall, these three approaches yield similar results. The correlations of these productivity measures are quite high: that between TFP-OLS and TFP-IN is 0.92; that between TFP-OLS and TFP-OP, 0.96. Thus, it is not surprising that our results do not hinge on how we measure productivity.
Appendix L. Classification of strategic industries
To identify industries with strategic importance, we started with government documents. Indeed, "national interests" has often been mentioned in government documents regarding SOE reforms. For example, in 2006, the State Council issued a document on the reorganization of SOEs (State Council, 2006) , and stated, "the state should maintain an absolute control over important industries that are related to national security and national economic growth." Immediately after the issuance of this document, Mr. Li Rongrong, director of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, enumerated the industries of strategic importance, which included oil and gas, coal, electricity, telecoms, public transportation, and the military industry (Li, 2006) . In 2011, Mr. Shao Ning, the vice director of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, stated in a speech that certain SOEs served national interests (Shao, 2011) . He listed four criteria for such SOEs: their products being the foundation of national economic development; enjoying monopoly or oligopoly in their operations; government control of pricing; and their social benefits outweighing their economic profits in importance (and often being loss-making). Mr. Shao further enumerated several such industries that serve "national interests": oil and gas, electricity, telecoms, water and gas supply, and public transportation.
More recently, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council (2015) issued the "Guidance on Deepening SOE Reforms," and the State Council (2016) issued the "Guidance on Pushing forward the Structural Adjustment and Reorganization of Central SOEs." These are the latest government documents on SOE reforms. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council (2015) classify SOEs into two types, the "business type," and the "public interest type." It is said that the evaluation of SOEs in the latter group would rely less on profits, but more on product quality, operation efficiency, and reliability. The State Council (2016) emphasizes controlling and strengthening the central SOEs that are related to national security and that serve as the foundation of the national economy, or that contribute to important national objectives. Based on these official speeches and government documents, it is clear that the Chinese government has always designated certain industries as having "strategic importance" or serving "national interests," and has taken a different approach to manage the SOEs in such industries.
We also look for guidance from research. In a recent study on China, Haley and Haley (2013) show that government subsidies have contributed significantly to China's success as the largest manufacturer and exporter in the world. They identified industries such as oil and gas, steel, aviation and aerospace, and automobiles as China's "national champions." Relatedly, in a study on Russia's privatization of SOEs and subsequent re-nationalization, Chernykh (2011) identifies the following strategically important sectors: Oil and gas; nuclear, aerospace, or defense engineering; telecom (except internet) or media; airports, seaports, rail, or pipelines; and special metals.
Based on these government documents and the academic literature, we identify the following manufacturing industries as China's strategic industries:
4 (1) Oil and gas, petroleum (07-oil and gas extraction; 25-petroleum, coking, and nuclear fuel processing); (2) nuclear fuel, aviation and aerospace, arms and ammunition (3663-arms and ammunition manufacturing; 3669-aviation and aerospace equipment manufacturing; 4413-nuclear power generation); (3) electricity, heat, gas, and water supply (44-electricity and heat production and supply; 45-gas production and supply; 46-water production and supply). We call these industries "strategic industries I." All these industries are regulated, and SOEs in these industries usually do not have pricing rights. While most of these categories mainly contain large SOEs that serve national interests, category (3) provides public utilities, which directly affects urban residents' approval of the government and exhibits stronger control benefits for the government.
For robustness checks, we consider an alternative, a slightly broader, definition of the strategic industries. We add a fourth category into the list to form "strategic industries II": (4) Automobile, locomotive, and ship (371-railway locomotive manufacturing; 372-automobile manufacturing; 375-ships manufacturing). The manufacturing of automobile, locomotive, and ship is often mentioned as China's national champions in official news reports. The automobile industry receives large subsidies from both the central and local governments (Haley and Haley, 2013) . The locomotive industry includes China's high-speed railway system, and is often regarded as the pride of the country. Note: This table summarizes the share of central SOEs in the strategic industries in terms of the number of firms, the number of employees, and the value added, respectively.
